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ABSTRACT
A large and growing line of research has used longitudinal
data to eliminate unobservable individual effects that may bias
cross-section parameter estimates. The resulting estimates, though
unbiased, are generally quite imprecise. This study shows that the
imprecision can arise from the measurement error that commonly
exists in the data used to represent the dependent variable in these
studies. The example of economists' salaries, which are
administrative data free of measurement error, demonstrates that
estimates based on changes in longitudinal data can be precise. The
results indicate the importance of improving the measurement of the
variables to which the increasingly high-powered techniques designed
to analyze panel data are applied. The estimates also indicate that
the payoff to citations to scholarly work is not an artifact of
unmeasured individual effects that could be biasing previous
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(517) 355-5238I. Introduction
Many studies of wage determination have estimated models
involving fixed individual effects using longitudinal data. Time-
series methods and "first-differencing circumvent the
unmeasurability of the fixed effects and produce estimates of the
structural parameters that accord with prior expectations. However,
the explanatory power of the equations is often remarkably low
relative to that of the corresponding cross-section equations. For
example, the R2 in Mincer (1983) are around .4 in cross-section
equations, but less than .02 in equations that are effectively ten-
year differences. Equally great differences are present in Mellow
(1981) using the same (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) data but
taking only one-year differences. A similar difference is produced
in Stafford-Duncan (1980) using another household survey.
The discrepancies between the R2 in equations based on changes
and those based on levels are not quite so huge in other studies.
Nonetheless, substantial differences also exist in work by Lazear
(1976), Brown (1980) and Duncan-Holmlund (1983). Presumably,
similar differences exist outside the realm of labor economics
(though with the exception of Holtz-Eakin et al, 1985, the
techniques have not been widely applied in other areas). The
discrepancies indicate no bias in the parameter estimates. They do,
though, coincide with an imprecision in the estimates that prevents
one from making strong statements about the true values of the
parameters.
A number of authors (Griliches-Hausman, 1986; Freeman, 1984;
Chowdhury-Nickell, 1985; and Jakubson, 1986) have recently discussed
1how measurement error in an independent variable produces biases
when differencing methods are used on longitudinal data. In Section
II I show how measurment error in the dependent variable can cause
the imprecise, but unbiased estimates noted in the empirical studies
discussed above. I then estimate a model involving fixed individual
effects in a new set of data collected for this purpose. Using
these data (covering the salaries of a group of academics), the
estimated R2 and the standard errors of the estimated parameters
differ little between cross-section and longitudinal models.
II. Fixed-Effects Models with Noisy Dependent Variables
Define the model as:
(1) =3X.+ Ø÷ E.t,
where 3 is the vector of parameters, and X is a vector of variables
observed at time t, which could include separate constant terms for
each t. y* is the true value of the dependent variable, is a
vector of unmeasured person-specific effects, and Eisan i.i.d.
disturbance. Let be defined as:
(2) = +
whereE(e.) =0;E(e) =o,and E(O.te.ti)pcr.The
formulation of in (2) specifies the wage as being measured with
an autocorrelated error.
Using (1) and (2) the variance of the error in (1) estimated
over levels is:
2 2 2 + clE +
2while that estimated over changes is:
2{c+ [l-P]}
Let the variance of be c, and let the autocorrelation of be
defined as P', so that E(YtYt_i) p'o. Then when (1) is
estimated over levels:
1 -[cl+c+ c1]/a.
When (1) is estimated over changes:
R2= 1 —2{cT
+[1—p]}/{cr[1—p']}
The difference between these coefficients of determination is:
(3) D {a[ p'p] +p'—ci[1—p']}/{o[1—p']}
If autocorrelation in the y exceeds that in the measurement
error, greater measurement errors increase D. We have no way of
estimating either P or p' in general. However, in their
validation study of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics Duncan-Hill
(1985) find the highest one-year autocorrelation of the measurement
error in earnings to be .43. Calculations on their data show
that the one-year autocorrelation of the logarithm of measured
earnings is .76.1 They also show that the variance ratio of
measurement error to the true value of the logarithm of annual
earnings is around .5. Taken together, these findings and
observations suggest that it is unsurprising that the literature is
replete with studies in which D is very large: Wage and earnings
data in the PSID and the other large household surveys that underlie
the studies discussed in Section I are characterized by substantial
3measurement error that is not very highly autocorrelated.
III. Longitudinal Estimates of the Determinants of Academic Salaries
To demonstrate that the estimation of models to account for
fixed effects by taking deviations around means need not lead to
imprecise estimates, consider the example of academic salaries. The
general model specifies the dependent variable, the logarithm of the
real compensation of the i'th faculty member at time t, as:
(1')
I estimate (1') in a variety of ways:
1. OLS estimates based on cross—sections of data at two
points in time.
2. OLS estimates based on deviations of the variables from
their means over time (the within' estimator), the same estimator
used in the studies referenced in Section I.
3. GLS estimates (Judge et al, 1985, pp. 522, passim.),
essentially a weighted average of the data used to produce 'within
and 'between' OLS estimates of (1'). This technique has not been
widely used in the literature on fixed effects in the determination
of wages. It can produce more efficient parameter estimates.
In Hamermesh et al (1982) we examined the determinants of the
1979-80 academic-year salaries of 148 full professors of economics
in 7 large public universities. Variables included in X were the
elapsed time since the individual obtained the Ph.D., EXP; the
average number of citations by others in the previous five years
(from the Social Science Citation Index), CIT; and a dummy variable
indicating whether the individual had been or currently was an
administrator at or above the level of department chair, AD.
Additional data were obtained from 6 of the 7 schools on the
additional administrative experience and the salary in 1985-86 of
the 100 full professors still on their faculties. With additional
data on citations these formed the basis for a 1985-86 cross
4section. It and the appropriate subset of the original data set
form a longitudinal data file on these 100 individuals.
The data on salaries were transformed to yield a measure of
compensation in real terms (that removes cross-section differences
in living costs).2 The means and standard deviations of the means
of the logarithm of this measure and of CIT are shown in Table 1 f or
the 6 schools separately and for the pooled sample of 100
observations.3 The average rate of citations increased in all 6
schools over the six-year period. The standard deviations of means
of the citations data are huge, partly because the distribution of
citations across observations is highly skewed. Examining the
autocorrelations of each variable (the r79,85), we see that there is
very strong persistence over time in rates of citation, and somewhat
less persistence in salaries.
The first two panels of Table 2 present estimates of (1')
based on the two cross sections of data, both for each of the 6
schools separately and for the pooled set of data. Comparing the
results across the two years there is no overall structural change
(other than a shift in the constant term).4 Tests for the inclusion
of school-specific dummy variables in the pooled data also yielded
test statistics that were not significant (1.00 and 1.78 for 1979-80
and 1985-86, each distributed F(5, 91)), and the parameter estimates
differed little from those presented in the Table.
Each additional year of experience raises pay by betweenand
1 percent even in this relatively homogeneous sample. Administra-
tive experience raises base salaries by over 10 percent. Whether
this is a compensating differential for time lost from research that
5Table 1
Descriptive Data, Salaries and Citations
School Number
Log Real
Compensation Pooled 1 2 3 4 5 6
1979 10.67 10.68 10.76 10.63 10.66 10.69 10.64
(.17) (.22) (.22) (.13) (.07) (.14) (.14)
1985 11.13 11.09 11.22 11.11 11.23 11.13 11.10
(.19) (.26) (.22) (.14) (.12) (.17) (.15)
r79,85
.76 .93 .63 .49 .74 .85 .75
Citations
1975—79 20.56 31.28 30.94 18.74 28.98 12.21 7.27
(24.58) (34.29)(28.90)(18.06) (33.b4) (10.10)(7.88)
1981—85 28.42 33.50 53.00 27.38 41.42 16.18 11.b2
(40.40) (32.86) (70.97) (27.92) (61.80) (16.04) (14.63)
r79,85 .86 .87 .93 .88 .97 .82 .57
100 20 13 19 11 17 20
Standard deviations of the means in parentheses.Table 2
Cross—SectionsandChanges,Equation(1) ./
SchoolNumber
1979—80 Pooled 1 2 3 4 5 a
EXP .0109 .0090 .0148 .0100 .0049 .0101 .UObd
(5.56) (1.61)(3.37)(2.53)(.90)(2.80)(1.72)
CIT .0032 .0045 .0045 .0039 .0012.0086 .0036
(6.36) (4.96) (3.18) (3.12) (1.94) (3.07) (.83)
AD .103 .253 .202 .229 .074 —.054
(2.99) (4.96) (1.82) (2.33) (1.02) (—.48)
.449 .681 .613 .445 .209 .444 .110
1985—86
EXP .0037 .0078 .0055—.0036—.0035.0136 —.001
(1.52) (1.15) (.72) (—.63) (—.44) (2.64) (—.15)
CIT .0025 .0057 .0018 .0023 .0013 .0088.0058
(5.94) (5.06)(1.83)(2.07)(2.66)(3.96)(2.58)
AD .091 .313 .109 .107 ——— .154 —.033
(2.35) (4.04)(.63)(1.31) (2.10)(—.48)
.256 .616 .034 .248 .354 .481 .187
Changes
CIT .0022 .0014 .0019 .0047 .0013.0065 .0009
(4.47) (1.13)(1.74)(2.47)(1.68)(4.99)(.46)
AD .125 .148 .088 ——— .093 .163
(3.07) (2.23) (.99) (2.46) (2.17)
.212 .171 .144 .219 .154 .748 .127
t—statistics in parentheses here and in Table 3.would raise other productivity-enhancing characteristics, or whether
it stems from rewards being paid to administrative activities
Se, is not knowable from this analysis. Scholarly achievement, as
indicated by citations of one's work by others, has a substantial
impact on salaries: Each extra citation per annum raises salary by
about .3 percent. The coefficient implies a difference in salary of
6.3 percent for a change equal to the iriterquartile range of CIT.
The R2 in these samples are fairly large in most cases, and in
the pooled sample (whose size begins to approach those of the
smaller data sets used in other studies of wages) it is quite
typical. However, as a comparison to the third panel of Table 2
shows, the R2 are not substantially larger than those that are
produced when (1') is estimated over changes between the two cross
sections.5 In this panel the equations fit nearly as well as in the
estimates over levels of the variables. The coefficient estimates
are in general signficantly nonzero, and they do not differ greatly
from the cross-section coefficients. In particular, the similarity
of the estimated effect of CIT in the data on changes demonstrates
the substantive point that previous estimates of its importance in
academic salary determination reflect more than its correlation with
unobserved unchanging individual characteristics.
The sample does not include the 37 professors who were in the
universities in 1979-80 but not in 1985-86.It is possible that
these people systematically self-selected out of their old jobs in a
way that makes the estimates of (1') inconsistent (Solon, 1986). I
cannot rule out this possibility; however, the only significant
predictor of whether a professor dropped out of the sample was EXP;
6and of the 37 drop-outs, 25 either retired or died. Moreover,
the hypothesis that the structure of (1') for these people differs
from that characterizing the 100 people who remained in the sample
cannot be rejected at the 95-percent level of confidence once a
separate constant for the drop-outs is included in (1').B
The relatively high values of R2 obtained in the data on
changes do not arise because there are no individual effects. The
test-statistic proposed by Breusch-Pagan (1980), which is
distributed X2(1), attains values of 7.06, 15.20 7.45, 13.00,
10.49, 6.23, 6.07, for the pooled sample and the six school samples
respectively. Each of these is significantly different from zero at
least at the 98 percent level of confidence. This suggests that the
error componenthas nonzero variance.
Table 3 presents GLS estimates of (1'). These are
essentially weighted averages of the data used to produce "within
and "between estimators of 3, with a weight, a, for the within
estimator equalling one minus the square root of the ratio of the
estimated variances from the 'within and unrestricted equations.
In the estimates for three of the schools the weighting coefficient
was negative, rendering the technique inapplicable. In the pooled
sample and in two other schools the coefficient a listed in Table 3
is small. Only in School 5 are the weights on the "within and
'between estimates roughly the same.
The GLS estimates differ from the cross-section estimates in
that they add a dummy variable, Dl, that allows for a separate
constant term for each cross section. Aside from this, though,




Pooled 1 5 6
EXP .0080 .0082 .0207 .0041
(4.79) (1.80) (2.88) (1.13)
CIT .0029 .0048 .0132 .0048
(8.60) (6.67) (4.19) (2.48)
AD .122 .267 .120 —.026
(4.57) (5.36) (1.27) (—.51)
Dl —.384 —.332 —.250 —.410
(—18.47) (—7.62) (—3.79) (—9.17)
.801 .846 .791 .787
.155 .279 .570 .129
a
—/ K U for schools 2, 3 and 4.the cross sections and the changes. The similar results produced by
all the changes and GLS estimation procedures suggest that the
simple cross-section estimates produced here and in Hamermesh et al
(1982) are not merely artifacts of a failure to use additional
information provided by panel data.
Unlike the numerous other studies that have generated fairly
precise estimates of cross-section wage equations and very imprecise
estimates of the same equations estimated over changes, this study
produces estimates whose precision differs little when data on
changes are used. Why are these results different from other
results? In this study measurement error is small or absent: The
data are from administrative records obtained directly from the
individuals who set the salaries of the people included in the
sample. That being so, it is not surprising that the differences in
the adjusted R2 between the levels and changes equations are much
smaller here than in other studies.7 That the R2 are somewhat
higher in the levels equations than in those estimated over (six-
year) first differences is due partly to the high autocorrelation in
the (true) earnings measures used here: The correlation of 1979-80
log real compensation with its value in 1985-86 is .76.
IV.Conclusions
Under reasonable assumptions about underlying correlations and
error variances, measurement error in the dependent variable is
likely to lead to relatively imprecise parameter estimates in
equations estimated by differencing out the fixed effects. In the
equations estimated here rio such imprecision exists because
measurement error is absent from the dependent variable. These
8considerations suggest we face a difficult choice: Either we obtain
data that are more appropriate for use in fixed-effects models; or
we recognize that the nature of the data underlying most studies
makes the application of standard techniques designed to handle
fixed individual effects questionable.
The application demonstrates a clear relationship between a
direct measure of academic productivity ---citationsby other
academics —--andthe economic rewards to academics. Previous work
has indicated that scholars whose work is more widely cited are
better paid. This study shows that the higher pay does not stem
from unmeasured characteristics that are correlated with greater
attention to a scholar's research. Instead, increases in a
scholar's professional recognition produce increases in his or her
compensation. In at least one segment of academe pay reflects
performance, as measured by the impact of one's ideas.
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1. The additional calculations were kindly provided by Greg Duncan.
2.If the campus is in a major metropolitan area, each observation
was dividied by COL[1 -FR],where COL is the ratio of the medium-
budget cost of living in the area and FR is the ratio of fringe
benefits to salary. The former is from Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Handbook, Bulletin 2070, Table 155; the latter are from annual
reports on the economic status of the profession, from the AAtJP
Bulletin for 1979-80, and from Academe, for 1985-86. The range of
the fringe/salary ratio is from .15 to .24 in 1979-80, and from .11
to .25 in 1985-86.
3. The schools are numbered exactly as in Hamermesh et al (1982).
4.F-tests for structural change (other than shifts of the
intercepts) yielded the following test statistics for the pooled
samples and the 6 schools separately: 2.09, F(3, 192); .27, F(3,26);
1.45, F(3,30); .30, F(3,32); .58, F(3,32); .83, F(3,18); and .23,
F(3,14). None of these is significant at usually applied critical
levels. However, test-statistics for changes in specific parameters
were significant for the coefficient on EXP in the pooled sample and
in the sample covering School 3. That the effect of EXP on
compensation is smaller in the second period is consistent with the
observation that all the members of the sample are six years older
than in the first period.
5. The EXP variable obviously drops out of the changes estimates
because each person aged 6 years between the two dates. In Schools
2 and 4 no additional sample members acquired administrative
experience between these dates.
6. The test statistic is F(3, 129) =2.73.
7.Viscusi—O'Connor (1984) present equations estimated over both
levels and changes in which the estimated R2 are fairly close. Like
the estimates here, the wage data underlying their equations are
obtained from administrative records rather than from recall by
workers.